

# DISTANT READING

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has replaced it. For some of the major European literatures, inter-continental, extra-European exchanges have quickly become the most important ones;<sup>43</sup> as for intra-European relationships, a continent that falls in love with Milan Kundera deserves to end like Atlantis. There is not much more to say, the conditions which have granted European literature its greatness have run their course, and only a miracle could reverse the trend. But Europe has probably already had more than its rightful share of miracles.

43 This is certainly the case for the Spanish and Portuguese literatures of Latin America, and for literatures in English from Asia and Africa (not to speak of America and Australia); francophone African literatures may soon play the same role.

## *Conjectures on World Literature*

*'Conjectures', too, was an occasional piece, like 'Modern European Literature' before it. At Columbia, the department of English and Comparative Literature was re-thinking its structure, and I had proposed to detach Comparative Literature from English; as a series of gloomy departmental confrontations got under way, the Italian Academy asked me to organize a small conference: four papers, of which mine would be one. It seemed like a good opportunity to bring disagreements into the open.*

*The discussion was on comparative literature; writing on world literature instead was, at the time, a somewhat polemical choice—and problematic, too: I remember considering the title 'World Literature?', with a question mark at the end, to signal my perplexity about a concept no one seemed to use any more. Pascale Casanova's *Republique mondiale des lettres*, which was about to be published while I was writing 'Conjectures', helped change this state of affairs; but back then, people were, at a minimum, sceptical (my colleagues at Columbia, for instance, refused to use the words 'World Literature' for the name of the new department). But I had found a strong conceptual model in Wallerstein's *world-systems theory*, and went ahead just the same.*

*Wallerstein's tripartition of core, periphery, and semi-periphery appealed to me because it explained a number of empirical findings I*

had slowly gathered in the course of the 1990s: France's continental centrality, so often mentioned in the essay on European literature; the peculiar productivity of the semi-periphery, analyzed in Modern Epic; the unevenness of narrative markets of the Atlas of the European Novel—all these, and more, strongly corroborated Wallerstein's model. Besides resting solidly on facts, the theory also highlighted the systemic constraints under which national literatures had to develop: in a starkly realistic reversal of the creative ecosystem of 'Modern European Literature', world-systems theory showed the power of core literatures to overdetermine, and in fact distort, the development of most national cultures.

Although based entirely on the work of Marxist thinkers—Jameson, Schwarz, Miyoshi, Mukherjee, and of course Wallerstein himself—and backed by quite a lot of historical evidence (or at least: a lot, given the parameters of literary history), 'Conjectures' provoked heated reactions on the left, to which I replied, three years later, in 'More Conjectures'. By an odd twist of fate, this first wave of critiques was followed by an even more violent one—this time, equanimously from the left and the right—aimed at the idea of 'distant reading'. That fatal formula had been a late addition to the paper, where it was initially specified, in an allusion to the basic procedure of quantitative history, by the words 'serial reading'. Then, somehow, 'serial' disappeared, and 'distant' remained. Partly, it was meant as a joke; a moment of relief in a rather relentless argument. But no one seems to have taken it as a joke, and they were probably right.



'Nowadays, national literature doesn't mean much: the age of world literature is beginning, and everybody should contribute to hasten its advent.' This was Goethe, of course, talking to Eckermann in 1827; and these are Marx and Engels, twenty years later, in 1848:

'National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the many national and local literatures, a world literature arises.' *Weltliteratur*: this is what Goethe and Marx have in mind. Not 'comparative', but world literature: the Chinese novel that Goethe was reading at the time of that exchange, or the bourgeoisie of the *Manifesto*, which has 'given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country'. Well, let me put it very simply: comparative literature has not lived up to these beginnings. It's been a much more modest intellectual enterprise, fundamentally limited to western Europe, and mostly revolving around the river Rhine (German philologists working on French literature). Not much more.

This is my own intellectual formation, and scientific work always has limits. But limits change, and I think it's time we returned to that old ambition of *Weltliteratur*: after all, the literature around us is now unmistakably a planetary system. The question is not really *what* we should do—the question is *how*. What does it mean, studying world literature? How do we do it? I work on west European narrative between 1790 and 1930, and already feel like a charlatan outside of Britain or France. World literature?

Many people have read more and better than I have, of course, but still, we are talking of hundreds of languages and literatures here. Reading 'more' seems hardly to be the solution. Especially because we've just started rediscovering what Margaret Cohen calls the 'great unread'. 'I work on west European narrative, etc. . . .' Not really, I work on its canonical fraction, which is not even 1 per cent of published literature. And again, some people have read more, but the point is that there are thirty thousand nineteenth-century British novels out there, forty, fifty, sixty thousand—no one really knows, no one has read them, no one ever will. And then there are French novels, Chinese, Argentinian, American . . .

Reading 'more' is always a good thing, but not the solution.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps it's too much, tackling the world and the unread at the same time. But I actually think that it's our greatest chance, because the sheer enormity of the task makes it clear that world literature cannot be literature, bigger; what we are already doing, just more of it. It has to be different. The *categories* have to be different. 'It is not the "actual" interconnection of "things"', Max Weber wrote, 'but the *conceptual* interconnection of *problems* which defines the scope of the various sciences. A new "science" emerges where a new problem is pursued by a new method.'<sup>2</sup> That's the point: world literature is not an object, it's a *problem*, and a problem that asks for a new critical method: and no one has ever found a method by just reading more texts. That's not how theories come into being; they need a leap, a wager—a hypothesis, to get started.

#### WORLD LITERATURE: ONE AND UNEQUAL

I will borrow this initial hypothesis from the world-systems school of economic history, for which international capitalism is a system that is simultaneously *one*, and *unequal*: with a core, and a periphery (and a semi-periphery) that are bound together in a relationship of growing inequality. One, and unequal: *one* literature (*Weltliteratur*, singular, as in Goethe and Marx), or perhaps, better, one world literary system (of inter-related literatures); but a system which is different from what Goethe and Marx had hoped for, because it's profoundly unequal. 'Foreign debt is as inevitable in Brazilian letters as in any other field', writes Roberto Schwarz in a splendid essay on 'The Importing of the Novel to Brazil': 'it's not simply an easily

1 I address the problem of the great unread in 'The Slaughterhouse of Literature', in this volume.

2 Max Weber, 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy', in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, New York 1949 (1904), p. 68.

dispensable part of the work in which it appears, but a complex feature of it';<sup>3</sup> and Itamar Even-Zohar, reflecting on Hebrew literature: 'Interference [is] a relationship between literatures, whereby a . . . source literature may become a source of direct or indirect loans [*Importing* of the novel, direct and indirect loans, foreign debt: see how economic metaphors have been subterraneously at work in literary history]—a source of loans for . . . a target literature . . . *There is no symmetry in literary interference. A target literature is, more often than not, interfered with by a source literature which completely ignores it.*'<sup>4</sup>

This is what one and unequal means: the destiny of a culture (usually a culture of the periphery, as Montserrat Iglesias Santos has specified)<sup>5</sup> is intersected and altered by another culture (from the core) that 'completely ignores it'. A familiar scenario, this asymmetry in international power—and later I will say more about Schwarz's 'foreign debt' as a complex literary feature. Right now, let me spell out the consequences of taking an explanatory matrix from social history and applying it to literary history.

#### DISTANT READING

Writing about comparative social history, Marc Bloch once coined a lovely 'slogan', as he himself called it: 'years of analysis for a day of synthesis';<sup>6</sup> and if you read Braudel or Wallerstein

3 Roberto Schwarz, 'The Importing of the Novel to Brazil and Its Contradictions in the Work of Roberto Alencar' (1977), in *Misplaced Ideas*, London 1992, p. 50.

4 Itamar Even-Zohar, 'Laws of Literary Interference', in *Poetics Today*, 1990, pp. 54, 62.

5 Montserrat Iglesias Santos, 'El sistema literario: teoría empírica y teoría de los polisistemas', in Dario Villanueva (ed.), *Avances en teoría de la literatura*, Santiago de Compostela 1994, p. 339: 'It is important to emphasize that interferences occur most often at the periphery of the system.'

6 Marc Bloch, 'Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes', *Revue de synthèse historique*, 1928.

you immediately see what Bloch had in mind. The text which is strictly Wallerstein's, his 'day of synthesis', occupies one-third of a page, one-quarter, maybe half; the rest are quotations (1,400, in the first volume of *The Modern World-System*). Years of analysis; other people's analysis, which Wallerstein's page synthesizes into a system.

Now, if we take this model seriously, the study of world literature will somehow have to reproduce this 'page'—which is to say: this relationship between analysis and synthesis—for the literary field. But in that case, literary history will quickly become very different from what it is now: it will become 'second hand': a patchwork of other people's research, *without a single direct textual reading*. Still ambitious, and actually even more so than before (world literature!); but the ambition is now directly proportional *to the distance from the text*: the more ambitious the project, the greater must the distance be.

The United States is the country of close reading, so I don't expect this idea to be particularly popular. But the trouble with close reading (in all of its incarnations, from the new criticism to deconstruction) is that it necessarily depends on an extremely small canon. This may have become an unconscious and invisible premise by now, but it is an iron one nonetheless: you invest so much in individual texts *only* if you think that very few of them really matter. Otherwise, it doesn't make sense. And if you want to look beyond the canon (and of course, world literature will do so: it would be absurd if it didn't!), close reading will not do it. It's not designed to do it, it's designed to do the opposite. At bottom, it's a theological exercise—very solemn treatment of very few texts taken very seriously—whereas what we really need is a little pact with the devil: we know how to read texts, now let's learn how *not* to read them. Distant reading: where distance, let me repeat it, *is a condition of knowledge*: it allows you to focus on units that are much smaller or

much larger than the text: devices, themes, tropes—or genres and systems. And if, between the very small and the very large, the text itself disappears, well, it is one of those cases when one can justifiably say, Less is more. If we want to understand the system in its entirety, we must accept losing something. We always pay a price for theoretical knowledge: reality is infinitely rich; concepts are abstract, are poor. But it's precisely this 'poverty' that makes it possible to handle them, and therefore to know. This is why less is actually more.<sup>7</sup>

#### THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NOVEL: RULE OR EXCEPTION?

Let me give you an example of the conjunction of distant reading and world literature. An example, not a model; and of course my example, based on the field I know (elsewhere, things may be very different). A few years ago, introducing Kojin Karatani's *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature*, Fredric Jameson noticed that in the take-off of the modern Japanese novel, 'the raw material of Japanese social experience and the abstract formal patterns of Western novel construction cannot always be welded together seamlessly'; and he referred in this respect to Masao Miyoshi's *Accomplices of Silence*, and Meenakshi Mukherjee's *Realism and Reality* (a study of the early Indian novel).<sup>8</sup> And it's true, these books return quite often to the complicated 'problems' (Mukherjee's term) arising from the encounter of Western form and Japanese or Indian reality.

Now, that the same configuration should occur in such different cultures as India and Japan—this was curious; and it became even

<sup>7</sup> Or to quote Weber again: 'concepts are primarily analytical instruments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data'. ('Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy', p. 106.) Inevitably, the larger the field one wants to study, the greater the need for abstract 'instruments' capable of mastering empirical reality.

<sup>8</sup> Fredric Jameson, 'In the Mirror of Alternate Modernities', in Karatani Kojin, *Origins of Modern Japanese Literature*, Durham-London 1993, p. xiii.

more curious when I realized that Roberto Schwarz had independently discovered very much the same pattern in Brazil. So, eventually, I started using these pieces of evidence to reflect on the relationship between markets and forms; and then, without really knowing what I was doing, began to treat Jameson's insight as if it were—one should always be cautious with these claims, but there is really no other way to say it—as if it were a *law of literary evolution*: in cultures that belong to the periphery of the literary system (which means: almost all cultures, inside and outside Europe), the modern novel first arises not as an autonomous development but as a compromise between a western formal influence (usually French or English) and local materials.

This first idea expanded into a little cluster of laws,<sup>9</sup> and it was all very interesting, but . . . it was still just an idea; a conjecture that had to be tested, possibly on a large scale, and so I decided to follow the wave of diffusion of the modern novel (roughly: from 1750 to 1950) in the pages of literary history. Gasperetti and Goscilo on late-eighteenth-century Eastern Europe;<sup>10</sup> Toschi and Martí-López on early-nineteenth-century Southern Europe;<sup>11</sup> Franco and

9 I have begun to sketch them out in the last chapter of the *Atlas of the European Novel 1800–1900* (London 1998), and this is more or less how they sound: second, the formal compromise is usually prepared by a massive wave of west European translations; third, the compromise itself is generally unstable (Miyoshi has a great image for this: the 'impossible programme' of Japanese novels); but fourth, in those rare instances when the impossible programme succeeds, we have genuine formal revolutions.

10 'Given the history of its formative stage, it is no surprise that the early Russian novel contains a host of conventions popularized in French and British literature', writes David Gasperetti in *The Rise of the Russian Novel* (DeKalb 1998, p. 5). And Helena Goscilo, in her 'Introduction' to Krasicki's *Adventures of Mr Nicholas Wisdom*: 'The *Adventures* is read most fruitfully in the context of the West European literature on which it drew heavily for inspiration.' (Ignacy Krasicki, *The Adventures of Mr Nicholas Wisdom*, Evanston 1992, p. xv.)

11 'There was a demand for foreign products, and production had to comply', explains Luca Toschi, speaking of the Italian narrative market around

Sommer on mid-century Latin America;<sup>12</sup> Frieden on the Yiddish novels of the 1860s;<sup>13</sup> Moosa, Said and Allen on the Arabic novels of the 1870s;<sup>14</sup> Evin and Parla on the Turkish novels of the same years;<sup>15</sup> Anderson on the Filipino *Noli Me Tangere*, of 1887; Zhao

1800 ('Alle origini della narrativa di romanzo in Italia', in Massimo Saltafuso [ed.], *Il viaggio del narrare*, Florence 1989, p. 19). A generation later, in Spain, 'readers are not interested in the originality of the Spanish novel; their only desire is that it would adhere to those foreign models with which they have become familiar': and so, concludes Elisa Martí-López, one may well say that between 1800 and 1850 'the Spanish novel is being written in France' (Elisa Martí-López, 'La orfandad de la novela española: política editorial y creación literaria a mediados del siglo XIX', *Bulletin Hispanique*, 1997).

12 'Obviously, lofty ambitions were not enough. All too often the nineteenth-century Spanish-American novel is clumsy and inept, with a plot derived at second hand from the contemporary European Romantic novel.' (Jean Franco, *Spanish-American Literature*, Cambridge 1969, p. 56.) 'If heroes and heroines in mid-nineteenth century Latin American novels were passionately desiring one another across traditional lines . . . those passions might not have prospered a generation earlier. In fact, modernizing lovers were learning how to dream their erotic fantasies by reading the European romances they hoped to realize.' (Doris Sommer, *Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America*, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1991, pp. 31–2.)

13 'Yiddish writers parodied—appropriated, incorporated, and modified—diverse elements from European novels and stories.' (Ken Frieden, *Classic Yiddish Fiction*, Albany 1995, p. x.)

14 Matti Moosa quotes the novelist Yahya Haqqi: 'there is no harm in admitting that the modern story came to us from the West. Those who laid down its foundations were persons influenced by European literature, particularly French literature. Although masterpieces of English literature were translated into Arabic, French literature was the fountain of our story.' (Matti Moosa, *The Origins of Modern Arabic Fiction*, 2nd edn, 1997 [1970], p. 93.) For Edward Said, 'at some point writers in Arabic became aware of European novels and began to write works like them.' (Edward Said, *Beginnings*, New York 1985 [1975], p. 81.) And Roger Allen: 'In more literary terms, increasing contacts with Western literatures led to translations of works of European fiction into Arabic, followed by their adaptation and imitation, and culminating in the appearance of an indigenous tradition of modern fiction in Arabic.' (Roger Allen, *The Arabic Novel*, Syracuse 1995, p. 12.)

15 'The first novels in Turkey were written by members of the new intelligentsia, trained in government service and well-exposed to French

and Wang on turn-of-the-century Qing fiction;<sup>16</sup> Obiechina, Irele and Quayson on West African novels between the 1920s and the 1950s<sup>17</sup> (plus of course Karatani, Miyoshi, Mukherjee, Even-Zohar and Schwarz). Four continents, 200 years, over twenty independent critical studies, and they all agreed: when a culture starts moving towards the modern novel, it's *always* as a compromise between foreign form and local materials. Jameson's 'law' had passed the

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literature', writes Ahmet O. Evin (*Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel*, Minneapolis 1983, p. 10); and Jale Parla: 'the early Turkish novelists combined the traditional narrative forms with the examples of the western novel' ('Desiring Tellers, Fugitive Tales: Don Quixote Rides Again, This Time in Istanbul').

16 'The narrative dislocation of the sequential order of events is perhaps the most outstanding impression late Qing writers received when they read or translated Western fiction. At first, they tried to tidy up the sequence of the events back into their pre-narrated order. When such tidying was not feasible during translation, an apologetic note would be inserted. . . . Paradoxically, when he alters rather than follows the original, the translator does not feel it necessary to add an apologetic note.' (Henry Y. H. Zhao, *The Uneasy Narrator: Chinese Fiction from the Traditional to the Modern*, Oxford 1995, p. 150.) 'Late Qing writers enthusiastically renewed their heritage with the help of foreign models', writes David Der-wei Wang: 'I see the late Qing as the beginning of the Chinese literary "modern" because writers' pursuit of novelty was no longer contained within indigenously defined barriers but was inextricably defined by the multilingual, crosscultural trafficking of ideas, technologies, and powers in the wake of nineteenth-century Western expansionism.' (*Fin-de-siècle Splendor: Repressed Modernities of Late Qing Fiction, 1849–1911*, Stanford 1997, pp. 5, 19.)

17 'One essential factor shaping West African novels by indigenous writers was the fact that they appeared after the novels on Africa written by non-Africans. . . . the foreign novels embody elements which indigenous writers had to react against when they set out to write.' (Emmanuel Obiechina, *Culture, Tradition and Society in the West African Novel*, Cambridge 1975, p. 17.) 'The first Dahomean novel, *Dogucimi*. . . is interesting as an experiment in recasting the oral literature of Africa within the form of a French novel.' (Abiola Irele, *The African Experience in Literature and Ideology*, Bloomington 1990, p. 147.) 'It was the rationality of realism that seemed adequate to the task of forging a national identity at the juncture of global realities. . . . the rationalism of realism dispersed in texts as varied as newspapers, Onitsha market literature, and in the earliest titles of the African Writers Series that dominated the discourses of the period.' (Ato Quayson, *Strategic Transformations in Nigerian Writing*, Bloomington 1997, p. 162.)

test—the first test, anyway.<sup>18 19</sup> And actually more than that: it had completely reversed the received historical explanation of these matters: because if the compromise between the foreign and the local is so ubiquitous, then those independent paths that are usually taken to be the rule of the rise of the novel (the Spanish, the French, and especially the British case)—*well, they're not the rule at all, they're the exception*. They come first, yes, but they're not at all typical. The 'typical' rise of the novel is Krasicki, Kemal, Rizal, Maran—not Defoe.

#### EXPERIMENTS WITH HISTORY

See the beauty of distant reading plus world literature: they go against the grain of national historiography. And they do so in the form of *an experiment*. You define a unit of analysis (like here, the formal compromise),<sup>20</sup> and then follow its metamorphoses in a vari-

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18 In the seminar where I first presented this 'second-hand' criticism, Sarah Golstein asked a very good, Candide-like question: You decide to rely on another critic. Fine. But what if he's wrong? My reply: If he's wrong, you are wrong too, and you soon know, because you don't find any corroboration—you don't find Goscilo, Martí-López, Sommer, Evin, Zhao, Irele. . . . And it's not just that you don't find positive corroboration; sooner or later you find all sorts of facts you cannot explain, and your hypothesis is falsified, in Popper's famous formulation, and you must throw it away. Fortunately, this hasn't been the case so far, and Jameson's insight still stands.

19 OK, I confess, in order to test the conjecture I actually did read some of these 'first novels' in the end (Krasicki's *Adventures of Mr Nicholas Wisdom*, Abramowitsch's *Little Man*, Rizal's *Noli Me Tangere*, Futabatei's *Ukigumo*, René Maran's *Batouala*, Paul Hazoumé's *Dogucimi*). This kind of 'reading', however, no longer produces interpretations but merely *tests* them: it's not the beginning of the critical enterprise, but its appendix. And then, here you don't really read the *text* anymore, but rather through the text, looking for your unit of analysis. The task is constrained from the start; it's a reading without freedom.

20 For practical purposes, the larger the geographical space one wants to study, the smaller should the unit of analysis be: a concept (in our case), a device, a trope, a limited narrative unit—something like this. In a follow-up paper, I hope to sketch out the diffusion of stylistic 'seriousness' (Auerbach's keyword in *Mimesis*) in nineteenth- and twentieth-century novels.

ety of environments<sup>21</sup>—until, ideally, *all* of literary history becomes a long chain of related experiments: a ‘dialogue between fact and fancy’, as Peter Medawar calls it: ‘between what could be true, and what is in fact the case’.<sup>22</sup> Apt words for this research, in the course of which, as I was reading my fellow historians, it became clear that the encounter of Western forms and local reality did indeed produce everywhere a structural compromise—as the law predicted—but also, that the compromise itself was taking rather different forms. At times, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century and in Asia, it tended to be very unstable:<sup>23</sup> an ‘impossible programme’,

21 How to set up a reliable sample—that is to say, what series of national literatures and individual novels provide a satisfactory test of a theory’s predictions—is of course quite a complex issue. In this preliminary sketch, my sample (and its justification) leave much to be desired.

22 Scientific research ‘begins as a story about a Possible World’, Medawar goes on, ‘and ends by being, as nearly as we can make it, a story about real life’. His words are quoted by James Bird in *The Changing World of Geography*, Oxford 1993, p. 5. Bird himself offers a very elegant version of the experimental model.

23 Aside from Miyoshi and Karatani (for Japan), Mukherjee (for India), and Schwarz (for Brazil), the compositional paradoxes and the instability of the formal compromise are often mentioned in the literature on the Turkish, Chinese and Arabic novel. Discussing Namik Kemal’s *Intibah*, Ahmet Evin points out how ‘the merger of the two themes, one based on the traditional family life and the other on the yearnings of a prostitute, constitute the first attempt in Turkish fiction to achieve a type of psychological dimension observed in European novels within a thematic framework based on Turkish life. However, due both to the incompatibility of the themes and to the difference in the degree of emphasis placed on each, the unity of the novel is blemished. The structural defects of *Intibah* are symptomatic of the differences between the methodology and concerns of the Turkish literary tradition on the one hand and those of the European novel on the other.’ (Evin, *Origins and Development*, p. 68; my emphasis.) Jale Parla’s evaluation of the Tanzimat period sounds a similar note: ‘behind the inclination towards renovation stood a dominant and dominating Ottoman ideology that recast the new ideas into a mould fit for the Ottoman society. The mould, however, was supposed to hold two different epistemologies that rested on irreconcilable axioms. *It was inevitable that this mould would crack and literature, in one way or another, reflects the cracks.*’ (‘Desiring Tellers, Fugitive Tales’, my emphasis.) In his discussion of the 1913 novel *Zaynab*, by Husayn Haykal, Roger Allen echoes Schwarz and Mukherjee (‘it is all too easy to point to the problems of psychological fallacy here, as

as Miyoshi says of Japan.<sup>24</sup> At other times it was not so: at the beginning and at the end of the wave, for instance (Poland, Italy and

Hamid, the student in Cairo acquainted with Western works on liberty and justice such as those of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, proceeds to discuss the question of marriage in Egyptian society on such a lofty plane with his parents, who have always lived deep in the Egyptian countryside’: *The Arabic Novel*, p. 34; my emphasis). Henry Zhao emphasizes from his very title—*The Uneasy Narrator*: and see the splendid discussion of uneasiness that opens the book—the complications generated by the encounter of Western plots and Chinese narrative: ‘A salient feature of late Qing fiction’, he writes, ‘is the greater frequency of narrative intrusions than in any previous period of Chinese vernacular fiction . . . The huge amount of directions trying to explain the newly adopted techniques betrays the narrator’s uneasiness about the instability of his status . . . the narrator feels the threat of interpretive diversification . . . moral commentaries become more tendentious to make the judgments unequivocal’, and at times the drift towards narratorial overkill is so overpowering that a writer may sacrifice narrative suspense ‘to show that he is morally impeccable’ (*Uneasy Narrator*, pp. 69–71).

24 In some cases, even translations of European novels went through all sorts of incredible somersaults. In Japan, in 1880, Tsubouchi’s translation of *The Bride of Lammermoor* appeared under the title *Shumpu jowa* (‘Spring Breeze Love Story’), and Tsubouchi himself ‘was not beyond excising the original text when the material proved inappropriate for his audience, or converting Scott’s imagery into expressions corresponding more closely to the language of traditional Japanese literature’ (Marleigh Grayer Ryan, ‘Commentary’ to Futabatei Shimei’s *Ukigumo*, New York 1967, pp. 41–2). In the Arabic world, writes Matti Moosa, ‘in many instances the translators of Western fiction took extensive and sometimes unwarranted liberties with the original text of a work. Yaqub Sarruf not only changed the title of Scott’s *Talisman* to *Qalb al-Asad wa Salah al-Din* [‘The Lion Heart and Saladin’], but also admitted that he had taken the liberty of omitting, adding, and changing parts of this romance to suit what he believed to be his audience’s taste . . . Other translators changed the titles and the names of the characters and the contents, in order, they claimed, to make the translated work more acceptable to their readers and more consistent with the native literary tradition.’ (*Origins of Modern Arabic Fiction*, p. 106.) The same general pattern holds for late Qing literature, where ‘translations were almost without exception tampered with . . . the most serious way of tampering was to paraphrase the whole novel to make it a story with Chinese characters and Chinese background . . . Almost all of these translations suffered from abridgement . . . Western novels became sketchy and speedy, and looked more like Chinese traditional fiction.’ (Henry Zhao, *Uneasy Narrator*, p. 229.)

Spain at one extreme; and West Africa on the other), historians describe novels that had, certainly, their own problems—but not problems arising from the clash of irreconcilable elements.<sup>25</sup>

I hadn't expected such a spectrum of outcomes, so at first I was taken aback, and only later realized that this was probably the most valuable finding of them all, because it showed that world literature was indeed a system—but a system of *variations*. The system was one, not uniform. The pressure from the Anglo-French core *tried* to make it uniform, but it could never fully erase the reality of difference. (See here, by the way, how the study of world literature is—inevitably—a study of the struggle for symbolic hegemony across the world.) The system was one, not uniform. And, retrospectively, of course it had to be like this: if

25 Why this difference? Probably, because in southern Europe the wave of French translations encountered a local reality (and local narrative traditions) that wasn't that different after all, and as a consequence, the composition of foreign form and local material proved easy. In West Africa, the opposite situation: although the novelists themselves had been influenced by Western literature, the wave of translations had been much weaker than elsewhere, and local narrative conventions were for their part extremely different from European ones (just think of orality); as the desire for the 'foreign technology' was relatively bland—and further discouraged, of course, by the anti-colonial politics of the 1950s—local conventions could play their role relatively undisturbed. Obiechina and Quayson emphasize the polemical relationship of early West African novels vis-à-vis European narrative: 'The most noticeable difference between novels by native West Africans and those by non-natives using the West African setting, is the important position which the representation of oral tradition is given by the first, and its almost total absence in the second.' (Emmanuel Obiechina, *Culture, Tradition and Society*, p. 25.) 'Continuity in the literary strategic formation we have identified is best defined in terms of the continuing affirmation of mythopeia rather than of realism for the definition of identity . . . That this derives from a conceptual opposition to what is perceived as a Western form of realism is difficult to doubt. It is even pertinent to note in this regard that in the work of major African writers such as Achebe, Armah, and Ngugi, the movement of their work has been from protocols of realist representation to those of mythopeic experimentation.' (Ato Quayson, *Strategic Transformations*, p. 164.)

after 1750 the novel arises just about everywhere as a compromise between west European patterns and local reality—well, local reality was different in the various places, just as Western influence was also very uneven: much stronger in Southern Europe around 1800, to return to my example, than in West Africa around 1940. The forces in play kept changing, and so did the compromise that resulted from their interaction. And this, incidentally, opens a fantastic field of inquiry for comparative morphology (the systematic study of how forms vary in space and time, which is also the only reason to keep the adjective 'comparative' in comparative literature): but comparative morphology is a complex issue, which deserves its own paper.

#### FORMS AS ABSTRACTS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Let me now add a few words on that term 'compromise'—by which I mean something a little different from what Jameson had in mind in his introduction to Karatani. For him, the relationship is fundamentally a binary one: 'the abstract formal patterns of Western novel construction' and 'the raw material of Japanese social experience': form and content, basically.<sup>26</sup> For me, it's more of a triangle: foreign form, local material—and *local form*. Simplifying somewhat: foreign *plot*; local *characters*; and then, local *narrative voice*: and it's precisely in this third dimension that these novels seem to be most unstable—most uneasy, as Zhao says of the late Qing

26 The same point is made in a great article by António Cândido: 'We [Latin American literatures] never create original expressive forms or basic expressive techniques, in the sense that we mean by romanticism, on the level of literary movements; the psychological novel, on the level of genres; free indirect style, on that of writing . . . the various nativisms never rejected the use of the imported literary forms . . . what was demanded was the choice of new *themes*, of different *sentiments*.' ('Literature and Underdevelopment', in César Fernández Moreno, Julio Ortega, and Ivan A. Shulman (eds), *Latin America in Its Literature*, New York 1980, pp. 272–3.)

narrator. Which makes sense: the narrator is the pole of comment, of explanation, of evaluation, and when foreign 'formal patterns' (or actual foreign presence, for that matter) make characters behave in strange ways (like Bunzo, or Ibarra, or Bràs Cubas), then of course comment becomes uneasy—garrulous, erratic, rudderless.

'Interferences', Even-Zohar calls them: powerful literatures making life hard for the others—making *structure* hard. And Schwarz: 'a part of the original historical conditions reappears as a sociological form . . . In this sense, forms are the abstract of specific social relationships.'<sup>27</sup> Yes, and in our case the historical conditions reappear as a sort of 'crack' in the form; as a faultline running between story and discourse, world and worldview: the world goes in the strange direction dictated by an outside power; the worldview tries to make sense of it, and is thrown off balance all the time. Like Rizal's voice (oscillating between Catholic melodrama and Enlightenment sarcasm),<sup>28</sup> or Futabatei's (caught between Bunzo's 'Russian' behaviour, and the Japanese audience inscribed in the text), or Zhao's hypertrophic narrator, who has completely lost control of the plot, but still tries to dominate it at all costs. This is what Schwarz meant with that 'foreign debt' that becomes a 'complex feature' of the text: the foreign presence 'interferes' with the very *utterance* of the novel.<sup>29</sup> The one-and-unequal literary

27 'The Importing of the Novel to Brazil', p. 53.

28 Rizal's solution, or lack thereof, is probably also related to his extraordinarily wide social spectrum (*Noli Me Tangere*, among other things, is the text that inspired Benedict Anderson to link the novel and the nation state): in a nation with no independence, an ill-defined ruling class, no common language and hundreds of disparate characters, it's hard to speak 'for the whole', and the narrator's voice cracks under the effort.

29 In a few lucky cases, the structural weakness may turn into a strength, as in Schwarz's interpretation of Machado, where the 'volatility' of the narrator becomes 'the stylization of the behaviour of the Brazilian ruling class': not a flaw any longer, but the very point of the novel: 'Everything in Machado de Assis's novels is coloured by the *volatility*—used and abused in different degrees—of

system is not just an external network here, it doesn't remain *outside* the text: it's embedded well into its form.

#### TREES, WAVES AND CULTURAL HISTORY

Forms are the abstract of social relationships: so, formal analysis is in its own modest way an analysis of power. (That's why comparative morphology is such a fascinating field: studying how forms vary, you discover how symbolic *power* varies from place to place.) And indeed, sociological formalism has always been my interpretive method, and I think that it's particularly appropriate for world literature . . . But, unfortunately, at this point I must stop, because my competence stops. Once it became clear that the key variable of the experiment was the narrator's voice, well, a genuine formal analysis was off limits for me, because it required a linguistic competence that I couldn't even dream of (French, English, Spanish, Russian, Japanese, Chinese and Portuguese, just for the core of the argument). And probably, no matter what the object of analysis is, there will always be a point where the study of world literature must yield to the specialist of the national literature, in a sort of cosmic and inevitable division of labour. Inevitable not just for practical reasons, but for theoretical ones. This is a large issue, but let me at least sketch its outline.

When historians have analyzed culture on a world scale (or on a large scale anyway), they have tended to use two basic cognitive metaphors: the tree and the wave. The tree, the phylogenetic tree

their narrators. The critics usually look at it from the point of view of literary technique or of the author's humour. There are great advantages in seeing it as the stylization of the behaviour of the Brazilian ruling class. Instead of seeking disinterestedness, and the confidence provided by impartiality, Machado's narrator shows off his impudence, in a gamut which runs from cheap gibes, to literary exhibitionism, and even to critical acts.' (Roberto Schwarz, 'The Poor Old Woman and Her Portraitist' [1983], in *Misplaced Ideas*, p. 94.)

derived from Darwin, was the tool of comparative philology: language families branching off from each other—Slavo-Germanic from Aryan-Greco-Italo-Celtic, then Balto-Slavic from Germanic, then Lithuanian from Slavic. And this kind of tree allowed comparative philology to solve that great puzzle which was also perhaps the first world-system of culture: Indo-European: a family of languages spreading from India to Ireland (and perhaps not just languages, a common cultural repertoire, too: but here the evidence is notoriously shakier). The other metaphor, the wave, was also used in historical linguistics (as in Schmidt's 'wave hypothesis', which explained certain overlaps among languages), but it played a role in many other fields as well: the study of technological diffusion, for instance, or the fantastic interdisciplinary theory of the 'wave of advance' by Cavalli-Sforza and Ammerman (a geneticist and an archaeologist), which explains how agriculture spread from the fertile crescent in the Middle East towards the north-west and then throughout Europe.

Now, trees and waves are both metaphors—but except for this, they have absolutely nothing in common. The tree describes the passage from unity to diversity: one tree, with many branches: from Indo-European, to dozens of different languages. The wave is the opposite: it observes uniformity engulfing an initial diversity: Hollywood films conquering one market after another (or English swallowing language after language). Trees need geographical *discontinuity* (in order to branch off from each other, languages must first be separated in space, just like animal species); waves dislike barriers, and thrive on geographical *continuity* (from the viewpoint of a wave, the ideal world is a pond). Trees and branches are what nation states cling to; waves are what markets do. And so on. Nothing in common, between the two metaphors. But—*they both work*. Cultural history is made of trees *and* waves—the wave of agricultural advance supporting the tree of Indo-European languages, which is then swept by new waves of linguistic and

cultural contact . . . And as world culture oscillates between the two mechanisms, its products are inevitably composite ones. Compromises, as in Jameson's law. That's why the law works: because it intuitively captures the intersection of the two mechanisms. Think of the modern novel: certainly a wave (and I've actually called it a wave a few times)—but a wave that runs into the branches of local traditions,<sup>30</sup> and is always significantly transformed by them.

This, then, is the basis for the division of labour between national and world literature: national literature, for people who see trees; world literature, for people who see waves. Division of labour . . . and challenge; because both metaphors work, yes, but that doesn't mean that they work equally well. The products of cultural history are always composite ones: but which is the dominant mechanism in their composition? The internal, or the external one? The nation or the world? The tree or the wave? There is no way to settle this controversy once and for all—fortunately: because comparatists need controversy. They have always been too shy in the presence of national literatures, too diplomatic: as if one had English, American, German literature—and then, next door, a sort of little parallel universe where comparatists studied a second set of literatures, trying not to disturb the first set. No; the universe is the same, the literatures are the same, we just look at them from a different viewpoint; and you become a comparatist for a very simple reason: *because you are convinced that that viewpoint is better*. It has greater explanatory power; it's conceptually more elegant; it avoids that ugly 'one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness'; whatever. The point is that there is no other justification for the study of world

30 'Grafting processes', Miyoshi calls them; Schwarz speaks of 'the implantation of the novel, and of its realist *strand* in particular', and Wang of 'transplanting Western narrative typologies'. And indeed, Belinsky had already described Russian literature as 'a *transplanted* rather than indigenous growth' in 1843.

literature (and for the existence of departments of comparative literature) but this: to be a thorn in the side, a permanent intellectual challenge to national literatures—especially the local literature. If comparative literature is not this, it's nothing. Nothing. 'Don't delude yourself', writes Stendhal of his favourite character: 'for you, there is no middle road.' The same is true for us.

## *The Slaughterhouse of Literature*

*For a dozen years—from the essay 'On Literary Evolution', in 1987, through the Appendix to The Way of the World (1990), 'Modern European Literature' (1992), the book Modern Epic (1996), and this essay—evolutionary theory was unquestionably the most important single influence on my work. Initially, it offered mostly a way to think about very large systems, like the European archipelago of 'Modern European Literature'; later, in Modern Epic, it helped me analyze small-scale mechanisms, like the mutations of the stream of consciousness, or the 'refunctionalization' of formal devices. 'Slaughterhouse' is a further, more detailed study of formal mutation and cultural selection, which began as part of a graduate seminar at Columbia. We started with a sample of late-nineteenth-century detective stories; with a well-defined formal trait (clues); and with the hypothesis that the destiny of individual stories would hinge on the handling of this formal trait. Except for Conan Doyle (about whom, in any case, what I thought I knew turned out to be wrong), I had no idea whether clues would be present or not in the stories we were going to read: had they been, then they clearly couldn't be the crucial survival trait; otherwise, perhaps we had the beginning of an explanation. And off we went.*

*The findings are reported in the pages that follow, and I won't anticipate them here; but this I will say: they were findings. And this was new. Up*

## *More Conjectures*

*'Conjectures on World Literature' received many critiques, and 'More Conjectures' was my attempt to respond to the most interesting ones. But the strongest objection materialized only after my response, in 2007, in a paper by Jérôme David. Here is the key passage:*

*If an economic system needs the periphery, because it is rich in cheap unskilled labor force, what is the function of its alleged equivalent in a literary world-system? In this regard the periphery has no function in the symbolic economy other than to arbitrate the rivalry between the 'narrative superpowers', through its variable porosity to each. This means, I think, that the interdependence of the economic systemic components is not of the same kind as the relations between the literary ones: the economic core could not exist without the peripheral productive force [but, by contrast] the core of the literary world system does not need the periphery in order to produce anything, because the logic of formal evolution is bound, in Moretti's analysis, to a Kuhnian conception of generic (i.e. paradigmatic) shifts that take place within the core. This is one limitation of the use of the Wallersteinian model in literary history: the economic background of the world-systems hypothesis highlights literary exchanges, but confers on them a misleading systematicity. Rumania, in the nineteenth-century space of the novel, means nothing to English or French writers and readers; it is not even the country of a*

cultural raw material (like folktales) that could be transformed at the core with symbolic benefits.<sup>1</sup>

*Let me radicalize David's point. When China banned the import of opium, or the sepoy of the East India Company rose up in arms, Britain went immediately to war, because—had it lost those markets—its entire social structure would have dramatically changed. Had the entire world closed its doors to British novels, however, the history of the English novel would have remained exactly the same. This was the problem that David had brought to light: a fundamental asymmetry in the structure of the literary system—and thus also of literary-historical explanation—whereby the activity of the literary core largely determines developments in the periphery, but the reverse is usually not the case. But if the (literary) periphery is not necessary to the existence of the (literary) core, then only half of Wallerstein's model can be fruitfully applied to literature; and is a half-model still a model—or no model at all? I am not sure; but if it were the latter, as I suspect, then the only response to David's critique would consist in repeating a sentence of 'More Conjectures' that addressed a different set of objections: 'Here things are easy: Parla and Arac are right—and I should have known better.' Those were difficult words to write, at the time; but extremely liberating. Once you have been really proved wrong, the argument is no longer about you; it's about a world of facts that everybody agrees to share (and respect); about hypotheses that have an objectivity of their own, and can be tested, modified, or indeed rejected. A little narcissistic wound is a small price to pay for such progress.*

1 David's paper, still unpublished, was presented at the conference, 'For a Theory of the Novel in the Twenty-first Century', at the Center for the Study of the Novel, at Stanford. The last sentence in the passage—'it is not even the country of a cultural raw material' etc.—is not entirely accurate, as core cultures do occasionally appropriate products that have been developed elsewhere, in order to re-market them under their own trademark. This, however, does not happen often enough to falsify David's assertion.



In the past year or so, several articles have addressed the issues raised in 'Conjectures on World Literature': Christopher Prendergast, Francesca Orsini, Efraín Kristal and Jonathan Arac in *New Left Review*, Emily Apter and Jale Parla elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> My thanks to all of them; and as I obviously cannot respond to every point in detail, I will focus here on the three main areas of disagreement among us: the (questionable) paradigmatic status of the novel; the relationship between core and periphery, and its consequences for literary form; and the nature of comparative analysis.

## I

One must begin somewhere, and 'Conjectures' tried to sketch how the literary world-system works by focusing on the rise of the modern novel: a phenomenon which is easy to isolate, has been studied all the world over, and thus lends itself well to comparative work. I also added that the novel was 'an example, not a model; and of course my example, based on the field I know (elsewhere, things may be very different)'. Elsewhere things are different indeed: 'If the novel can be seen as heavily freighted with the political, this is not patently the case for other literary genres. Drama seems to travel less anxiously . . . How might the . . . construct work with

2 'Conjectures on World Literature', *New Left Review* II/1 (January–February 2000); Christopher Prendergast, 'Negotiating World Literature', *New Left Review* II/8 (March–April 2001); Francesca Orsini, 'Maps of Indian Writing', *New Left Review* II/13 (January–February 2002); Efraín Kristal, "'Considering Coldly . . .": A Response to Franco Moretti', *New Left Review* II/15 (May–June 2002); Jonathan Arac, 'Anglo-Globalism?' *New Left Review* II/16 (July–August 2002); Emily Apter, 'Global *Translatio*: The "Invention" of Comparative Literature, Istanbul, 1933', *Critical Inquiry* 29 (2003); Jale Parla's essay ('The Object of Comparison') was published in a special issue of *Comparative Literature Studies* edited by Djelal Kadir (January 2004).

lyric poetry?’ asks Prendergast; and Kristal: ‘Why doesn’t poetry follow the laws of the novel?’<sup>3</sup>

It doesn’t? I wonder. What about Petrarchism? Propelled by its formalized lyrical conventions, Petrarchism spread to (at least) Spain, Portugal, France, England, Wales, the Low Countries, the German territories, Poland, Scandinavia, Dalmatia (and, according to Roland Greene, the New World). As for its depth and duration, I am sceptical about the old Italian claim that by the end of the sixteenth century over two hundred *thousand* sonnets had been written in Europe in imitation of Petrarch; still, the main disagreement seems to be, not on the enormity of the facts, but on the enormity of their enormity—ranging from a century (Navarrete, Fucilla), to two (Manero Sorolla, Kennedy), three (Hoffmeister, Kristal himself), or five (Greene). Compared to the wave-like diffusion of this ‘*lingua franca* for love poets’, as Hoffmeister calls it, western novelistic ‘realism’ looks like a rather ephemeral vogue.<sup>4</sup>

3 ‘Conjectures’, p. 58; ‘Negotiating World Literature’, pp. 120–1; “‘Considering Coldly . . .’”, p. 62. Orsini makes a similar point for Indian literature: ‘Moretti’s novel-based theses would seem to have little application to the Subcontinent, where the major nineteenth and twentieth-century forms have been poetry, drama and the short story, whose evolution may show quite different patterns of change’: ‘Maps’, p. 79.

4 See Antero Meozzi, *Il petrarchismo europeo (secolo xvi)* (Pisa 1934); Leonard Forster, *The Icy Fire: Five Studies in European Petrarchism* (Cambridge 1969); Joseph Fucilla, *Estudios sobre el petrarquismo en España* (Madrid 1960); Ignacio Navarrete, *Orphans of Petrarch* (California 1994); William Kennedy, *Authorizing Petrarch* (Ithaca, NY 1994); Maria Pilar Manero Sorolla, *Introducción al estudio del petrarquismo en España* (Barcelona 1987); Gerhart Hoffmeister, *Petrarkistische Lyrik* (Stuttgart 1973); Roland Greene, *Post-Petrarchism: Origins and Innovations of the Western Lyric Sequence* (Princeton 1991). Kristal’s implicit acknowledgement of the hegemony of Petrarchism over European and Latin American poetry comes where he writes that ‘the lyrical conventions of modern Spanish poetry were developed in the 16th century by Boscán and Garcilaso de la Vega . . . The first signs of a reaction against the strictest conventions of Spanish prosody did not take place in Spain but in Spanish America in the 1830s’: “‘Considering Coldly . . .’”, p. 64.

Other things being equal, anyway, I would imagine literary movements to depend on three broad variables—a genre’s potential market, its overall formalization and its use of language—and to range from the rapid wave-like diffusion of forms with a large market, rigid formulas and simplified style (say, adventure novels), to the relative stasis of those characterized by a small market, deliberate singularity and linguistic density (say, experimental poetry). Within this matrix, novels would be representative, not of the *entire* system, but of its most mobile strata, and by concentrating only on them we would probably overstate the mobility of world literature. If ‘Conjectures’ erred in that direction it was a mistake, easily corrected as we learn more about the international diffusion of drama, poetry and so on (here, Donald Sassoon’s current work on cultural markets will be invaluable).<sup>5</sup> Truth be told, I would be very disappointed if all of literature turned out to ‘follow the laws of the novel’: that a single explanation may work *everywhere* is both very implausible and extraordinarily boring. But before indulging in speculations at a more abstract level, we must learn to share the significant facts of literary history across our specialized niches. Without collective work, world literature will always remain a mirage.

## II

Is world-systems theory, with its strong emphasis on a rigid international division of labour, a good model for the study of world literature? On this, the strongest objection comes from Kristal: ‘I am arguing, however, in favour of a view of world literature’, he writes,

in which the West does not have a monopoly over the creation of forms that count; in which themes and forms can move in several

5 See, for a preliminary account, his ‘On Cultural Markets’, *New Left Review* II/17 (September–October 2002).

directions—from the centre to the periphery, from the periphery to the centre, from one periphery to another, while some original forms of consequence may not move much at all.<sup>6</sup>

Yes, forms *can* move in several directions. But *do* they? This is the point, and a theory of literary history should reflect on the constraints on their movements, and the reasons behind them. What I know about European novels, for instance, suggests that hardly any forms 'of consequence' don't move at all; that movement from one periphery to another (without passing through the centre) is almost unheard of;<sup>7</sup> that movement from the periphery to the centre is less rare, but still quite unusual, while that from the centre to the periphery is by far the most frequent.<sup>8</sup> Do these facts imply that the West

6 "Considering Coldly . . .", pp. 73–4.

7 I mean here the movement between peripheral cultures which do not belong to the same 'region': from, say, Norway to Portugal (or vice versa), not from Norway to Iceland or Sweden, or from Colombia to Guatemala or Peru. Sub-systems made relatively homogeneous by language, religion or politics—of which Latin America is the most interesting and powerful instance—are a great field for comparative study, and may add interesting complications to the larger picture (like Darío's modernism, evoked by Kristal).

8 The reason why literary products flow from the centre to the periphery is spelt out by Even-Zohar in his work on polysystems, extensively quoted at the beginning of 'Conjectures': peripheral (or, as he calls them, 'weak') literatures 'often do not develop the same full range of literary activities . . . observable in adjacent larger literatures (which in consequence may create a feeling that they are indispensable)'; 'a weak . . . system is unable to function by confining itself to its home repertoire only', and the ensuing lack 'may be filled, wholly or partly, by translated literature'. Literary weakness, Even-Zohar goes on, 'does not necessarily result from political or economic weakness, although rather often it seems to be correlated with material conditions'; as a consequence, 'since peripheral literatures in the Western hemisphere tend more often than not to be identical with literatures of smaller nations, as unpalatable as this idea may seem to us, we have no choice but to admit that within a group of reliable national literatures, such as the literatures of Europe, hierarchical relations have been established since the very beginnings of these literatures. Within this (macro-)polysystem some literatures have taken peripheral positions, which is only to say that they were often modelled

has 'a monopoly over the creation of the forms that count'? Of course not.<sup>9</sup> Cultures from the centre have more resources to pour into innovation (literary and otherwise), and are thus more likely to produce it: but a monopoly over creation is a theological attribute, not an historical judgment.<sup>10</sup> The model proposed in 'Conjectures' does not reserve invention to a few cultures and deny it to the others: it specifies *the conditions under which it is more likely to occur*, and the forms it may take. Theories will never abolish inequality: they can only hope to explain it.

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to a large extent upon an exterior literature.' Itamar Even-Zohar, 'Polysystem Studies', *Poetics Today*, Spring 1990, pp. 47, 81, 80, 48.

9 Nor does it have a monopoly over criticism that counts. Of the twenty critics on whose work the argument of 'Conjectures' rests, writes Arac, 'one is quoted in Spanish, one in Italian, and eighteen in English'; so, 'the impressive diversity of surveying some twenty national literatures diminishes into little more than one single means by which they may be known. English in culture, like the dollar in economics, serves as the medium through which knowledge may be translated from the local to the global': 'Anglo-Globalism?', p. 40. True, eighteen critics are quoted in English. But as far as I know only four or five are from the country of the dollar, while the others belong to a dozen different cultures. Is this less significant than the language they use? I doubt it. Sure, global English may end up impoverishing our thinking, as American films do. But for now, the rapid wide public exchanges it makes possible far exceed its potential dangers. Parla puts it well: 'To unmask the hegemony [of imperialism] is an intellectual task. It does no harm to know English as one sets out for the task.'

10 After all, my last two books end on the formal revolutions of Russian and Latin American narrative—a point also made (not 'conceded', as Kristal puts it, suggesting reluctance on my part) in an article on European literature ('an importer of those formal novelties that it is no longer capable of producing'), another one on Hollywood exports ('a counter-force at work within the world literary system') and in 'Conjectures' itself. See 'Modern European Literature: A Geographical Sketch', p. 42; 'Planet Hollywood', p. 105. 'Conjectures' pointed out that 'in those rare instances when the impossible programme succeeds, we have genuine formal revolutions' (p. 50, footnote 9), and that 'in a few lucky cases, the structural weakness may turn into a strength, as in Schwarz's interpretation of Machado' (p. 58, footnote 29).

## III

Kristal also objects to what he calls the 'postulate of a general homology between the inequalities of the world economic and literary systems': in other words, 'the assumption that literary and economic relationships run parallel may work in some cases, but not in others'.<sup>11</sup> Even-Zohar's argument is a partial response to the objection; but there is another sense in which Kristal is right, and the simplifying euphoria of an article originally conceived as a thirty-minute talk is seriously misleading. By reducing the literary world-system to core and periphery, I erased from the picture the transitional area (the semi-periphery) where cultures move in and out of the core; as a consequence, I also understated the fact that in many (and perhaps most) instances, material and intellectual hegemony are indeed very close, but not quite identical.

Let me give some examples. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the long struggle for hegemony between Britain and France ended with Britain's victory on all fronts—except one: in the world of narrative, the verdict was reversed, and French novels were both more successful and formally more significant than British ones. Elsewhere I have tried to explain the reasons for the morphological supremacy of German tragedy from the mid eighteenth century on; or the key role of semi-peripheral realities in the production of modern epic forms. Petrarchism, which reached its international zenith when its wealthy area of origin had already catastrophically declined (like those stars which are still shining long after their death), is a particularly spooky instance of this state of affairs.

All these examples (and more) have two features in common. First, they arise from cultures which are close to, or inside the core of the system—but are not hegemonic in the economic sphere. France

11 "Considering Coldly . . .", pp. 69, 73.

may be the paradigm here, as if being an eternal second in the political and economic arena encouraged investment in culture (as in its feverish post-Napoleonic creativity, compared to the postprandial somnolence of the victorious Victorians). A—limited—discrepancy between material and literary hegemony does therefore exist: wider in the case of innovation per se (which does not require a powerful apparatus of production and distribution), and narrower, or absent, in the case of diffusion (which does).<sup>12</sup> Yet, and this is the second feature in common, all these examples *confirm the inequality of the world literary system*: an inequality which does not coincide with economic inequality, true, and allows some mobility—but a mobility *internal* to the unequal system, not alternative to it. At times, even the dialectic between semi-periphery and core may actually widen the overall gap (as in the instances mentioned in footnote 12, or when Hollywood quickly 'remakes' successful foreign films, effectively strengthening its own position). At any rate, this is clearly another field where progress will only be possible through the good coordination of specific local knowledge.

12 The fact that innovations may arise in the semi-periphery, but then be captured and diffused by the core of the core, emerges from several studies on the early history of the novel (by Armstrong, Resina, Trumpener and others: all written in total independence from world-systems theory), which have pointed out how often the culture industry of London and Paris discovers a foreign form, introduces a few improvements, and then retails it as its own throughout Europe (ending in the masterstroke of the 'English' novelist Walter Scott). As the picaresque declines in its native country, *Gil Blas* and *Moll Flanders* and *Marianne* and *Tom Jones* spread it all over Europe; epistolary novels, first written in Spain and Italy, become a continental craze thanks to Montesquieu and Richardson (and then Goethe); American 'captivity narratives' acquire international currency through *Clarissa* and the Gothic; the Italian 'melodramatic imagination' conquers the world through Parisian *feuilletons*; the German *Bildungsroman* is intercepted by Stendhal, Balzac, Dickens, Brontë, Flaubert, Eliot . . . This is of course not the only path of literary innovation, perhaps not even the main one; but the mechanism is certainly there—half swindle, half international division of labour—and has an interesting similarity to larger economic constraints.

## IV

The central morphological point of 'Conjectures' was the contrast between the rise of the novel in the core as an 'autonomous development', and the rise in the periphery as a 'compromise' between a Western influence and local materials. As Parla and Arac point out, however, early English novels were written, in Fielding's words, 'after the manner of Cervantes' (or of someone else), thus making clear that a compromise between local and foreign forms occurred there as well.<sup>13</sup> And if this was the case, then there was no 'autonomous development' in western Europe, and the idea that forms have, so to speak, *a different history* at the core and at the periphery crumbles. The world-systems model may be useful at other levels, but has no explanatory power at the level of form.

Here things are easy: Parla and Arac are right—and I should have known better. After all, the thesis that literary form is *always* a compromise between opposite forces has been a leitmotiv of my intellectual formation, from Francesco Orlando's Freudian aesthetics to Gould's 'Panda principle', or Lukács's conception of realism. How on earth could I 'forget' all this? In all likelihood, because the core/periphery opposition made me look (or wish . . .) for a parallel morphological pattern, which I then couched in the wrong conceptual terms.<sup>14</sup>

So let me try again. 'Probably all systems known to us have emerged and developed with interference playing a prominent role', writes Even-Zohar: 'there is not one single literature which did not emerge through interference with a more established literature: and no

13 'Anglo-Globalism?', p. 38.

14 This seems a good illustration of the 'Kuhnian' point that theoretical expectations will shape facts according to your wishes—and an even better illustration of the 'Popperian' point that facts (usually gathered by those who disagree with you) will be finally stronger.

literature could manage without interference at one time or another during its history'.<sup>15</sup> No literature without interference . . . hence, also, no literature without compromises between the local and the foreign. But does this mean that all types of interference and compromise *are the same*? Of course not: the picaresque, captivity narratives, even the *Bildungsroman* could not exert the same pressure over French or British novelists that the historical novel or the *mystères* exerted over European and Latin American writers: and we should find a way to express this difference. To recognize when a compromise occurs as it were *under duress*, and is thus likely to produce more unstable and dissonant results—what Zhao calls the 'uneasiness' of the late Qing narrator.

The key point, here, is this: if there is a strong, systematic constraint exerted by some literatures over the others (and we all seem to agree that there is),<sup>16</sup> then we should be able to recognize its effects *within literary form itself*: because forms are indeed, in Schwarz's words, 'the abstract of specific social relationships'. In 'Conjectures', the diagram of forces was embodied in the sharp qualitative opposition of 'autonomous developments' and 'compromises'; but as that solution has been falsified, we must try something else. And, yes, 'measuring' the extent of foreign pressure on a text, or its structural

15 'Polysystem Studies', p. 59. A page later, in a footnote, Even-Zohar adds: 'This is true of almost all literatures of the Western hemisphere. As for the Eastern hemisphere, admittedly, Chinese is still a riddle as regards its emergence and early development.'

16 Except Orsini: 'Implicit in [Casanova's] view—explicit in Moretti's—is the traditional assumption of a "source" language, or culture—invariably carrying an aura of authenticity—and a "target" one, seen as in some way imitative. In place of this, Lydia Liu much more usefully proposed the concept of "guest" and "host" languages, to focus attention on the translingual practice through which the hosts may appropriate concepts and forms . . . Cultural influence becomes a study of appropriation, rather than of centres and peripheries: 'Maps', pp. 81–2. The culture industry as a 'guest' invited by a 'host' who 'appropriates' its forms . . . Are these concepts—or daydreams?

instability, or a narrator's uneasiness, will be complicated, at times even unfeasible. But a diagram of symbolic power is an ambitious goal, and it makes sense that it would be hard to achieve.

## V

Two areas for future discussion emerge from all this. The first concerns the type of knowledge literary history should pursue. 'No science, no laws' is Arac's crisp description of Auerbach's project; and there are similar hints in other articles too. This is of course the old question of whether the proper objects of historical disciplines are individual cases or abstract models; and as I will argue at extravagant length for the latter in a series of forthcoming articles, here I will simply say that we have a lot to learn from the methods of the social and of the natural sciences. Will we then find ourselves, in Apter's words, 'in a city of bits, where micro and macro literary units are awash in a global system with no obvious sorting device'? I hope so . . . it would be a very interesting universe. So, let's start looking for good sorting devices. 'Formalism without close reading', Arac calls the project of 'Conjectures', and I can't think of a better definition. Hopefully, it will also be a formalism where the 'details' so dear to him and to Prendergast will be highlighted, not erased by models and 'schemas'.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, politics. Several articles mention the political pressure behind Auerbach's *Mimesis*, or Casanova's *République mondiale des lettres*. To them I would add Lukács's two versions of comparative literature: the one which crystallized around the First World War, when *The Theory of the Novel* and its (never completed) companion study on Dostoevsky mused on whether a world beyond capitalism could even still be imagined; and the one which took shape in the thirties, as a long meditation on the opposite political significance of

17 Arac, 'Anglo-Globalism?', pp. 41, 38; Apter, 'Global Translatio', p. 255.

German and French literature (with Russia again in the background). Lukács's spatio-temporal horizon was narrow (the nineteenth century, and three European literatures, plus Cervantes in *The Theory of the Novel*, and Scott in *The Historical Novel*); his answers were often opaque, scholastic, philistine—or worse. But his lesson lies in how the articulation of his comparative scenario (western Europe or Russia; Germany or France) is simultaneously an attempt to understand the great political dilemmas of his day. Or in other words: *the way we imagine comparative literature is a mirror of how we see the world*. 'Conjectures' tried to do so against the background of the unprecedented possibility that the entire world may be subject to a single centre of power—and a centre which has long exerted an equally unprecedented symbolic hegemony. In charting an aspect of the prehistory of our present, and sketching some possible outcomes, the article may well have overstated its case, or taken some wrong turns altogether. But the relationship between project and background stands, and I believe it will give significance and seriousness to our work in the future. Early March 2003, when these pages are being written, is in this respect a wonderfully paradoxical moment, when, after twenty years of unchallenged American hegemony, millions of people everywhere in the world have expressed their enormous distance from American politics. As human beings, this is cause to rejoice. As cultural historians, it is cause to reflect.